

adopted, for which no precedent is to be found in the history of Jamaica—the act was proclaimed, and stuck up on the doors of the House of Assembly.

We are not surprised, therefore,—that the Assembly, as soon as it met, should give expression to that feeling, which the course of proceedings we have recounted was sure to excite. Whether the following resolution, which it adopted for that purpose, may not have been more strong than was necessary, we do not stop to inquire ; but it is highly creditable to the Assembly, that so far from seeking to embarrass Her Majesty's government by stopping the supplies, at the time they proceeded to determine not to engage in general legislation until they had obtained redress from the government, they expressed their readiness to proceed with that legislation which would enable them to keep faith with the public creditor, or, in other words, to raise the supplies for the service of the government. We shall by and by see the ample manner in which the Assembly, in its present session, has evinced the sincerity with which it expressed that readiness.

RESOLVED, “ firstly—That the act of the British parliament, intituled ‘ An Act for the better Government, of Prisons in the West Indies,? is a violation of our inherent rights as British subjects, as recognized by the constitution of this island, and by the act of parliament 18 Geo. 3. c. 12. ; that the same has not, nor ought to have the force of law in this island, and that the authorities will not be justified in acting on it.

“ Resolved, secondly—That the violation of our rights by the Parliament of Great Britain, in which we are not represented, is the less excusable, inasmuch as the House was prepared to enter into the consideration of prison discipline as soon as the report of Her Majesty's commissioner was officially before them.

“ Resolved, thirdly—That the House have witnessed, with the deepest regret, the unmerited censure passed upon the inhabitants of this island—the extent to which the public mind in Great Britain has been poisoned against them—the absence of all confidence in the legislature—the reckless manner in which the laws passed by it have been disallowed—and the system of legislation for the colonies which has been determined on, whereby the power of the House has been fettered, and that body has ceased to exist, for any useful purpose, to the people whom they represent.

“ Resolved, fourthly—Therefore, that in the opinion of this House, they will best consult their own honour, the rights of their constituents, and the peace and well-being of the colony, by abstaining from the exercise of any legislative functions, excepting such as may be necessary to preserve inviolate the faith of the island with the public creditor, until Her Most Gracious Majesty's pleasure shall be made known, whether her subjects of Jamaica, now happily all in a state of freedom, are henceforth to be treated as subjects, with the power of making laws, as hitherto, for their own government, or whether they are to be treated as a conquered colony, and governed by parliamentary legislation, orders in council, or, as in the case of the late amended Abolition Act, by investing the governors of the

island with the arbitrary power of issuing proclamations, having the force of law, over the lives and property of the people. ”

These resolutions were adopted on the 31st of October, the second day after the House of Assembly met, according to the terms of a former prorogation. Having passed these resolutions, the governor prorogued the House for one day, when the Assembly again met on the 3rd of November, and adhered to the resolutions of the 31st of October. The governor then appealed to the “constituency” of the island : writs were issued for a general election, and it is remarkable that the **very** same members were returned, excepting only such as had voted against the resolutions of the 31st of October. The Assembly again met on the 18th December, when their previous resolutions were again adopted.

‘It would have been supposed that the colonial secretary would have directed Sir Lionel Smith, upon the meeting of the Assembly, to have laid the act before them, accompanied by such explanations, and such evidence of **friendly** disposition on the part of the government, as might have reconciled them to it, and have satisfied them that there was no intention to interfere with their rights of internal legislation. But instead of this, Sir Lionel Smith met the House without making, in the speech with which he opened the session, the slightest allusion to the prisons-act, although he must have been apprized by the government, and he certainly knew from the protests and correspondence of the **agent,** to which the governor has access, that it would be the means of exciting great irritation and dissatisfaction.

The course **just** suggested, would indeed have been the most common and obvious mode of putting the Assembly in a situation to deal with the question ; but if the governor did not **like** to introduce the subject into his speech on the 30th October, he had on the 31st an opportunity of making a communication to them. Again, when the House assembled on the 2nd of November, he might have sent a message to them. So again when they met on the 3rd ; but on neither of these occasions did the governor send them any communication alluding to the subject. The same extraordinary course was pursued by the government at home : even when they must have been in possession of the fact, that Sir **Lionel** Smith had dissolved the Assembly, no step was taken to supply him with the means of making any communication to the Assembly when they should meet again after the subsequent prorogation.- Although the government was in possession on the 10th of December, of the course which had been taken by the Assembly, of the view entertained by them of the **prisons-act**, and of the **resolu**

tions which they had adopted ; yet not a single despatch was forwarded to the governor, instructing him how to act towards the Assembly at its next meeting.

Surely there was abundant opportunity to have placed in the hands of Sir Lionel Smith a despatch from Her Majesty's government, which he might have communicated to the Assembly at their meeting, and which might have afforded them an opportunity of receding from the views which they had previously taken, and of resuming their legislative functions. No such measures of conciliation were, however, adopted. The governor first prorogued the Assembly from the 20th December to the 5th February, subsequently to the 8th of March, and kept them continually under prorogation.

We have thus traced the course of the proceedings connected with this important contest, as they successively occurred in the island of **Jamaica**, and in so doing, have brought this highly interesting, but hitherto painful narrative, down to the close of the session of 1838. In our ensuing number we shall take occasion to consider the effect produced by 'these measures on the government at home, and shall then pass on to the more agreeable task of recording the mild and conciliatory system of policy pursued by Sir Charles Metcalfe, and which we shall see has had all the effect that might have been anticipated from so wise and prudent a course, at once setting at rest those unhappy differences, and producing on all sides the most beneficial results.

[To be continued.]

PAST AND PRESENT STATE OF THE FRENCH NAVY.

In preceding numbers, we have endeavoured to elucidate the past and present condition of our maritime affairs, as compared with foreigners, in order to show that the alarm which has been raised on the score of our naval decline, is groundless. In the execution of this design, we have steered clear of all party or political discussion, seldom adverting to such, except when it became necessary to contradict some fallacy that had been circulated, and impressed upon the public, and which it was our duty to expose, in order that the subject might be fairly considered upon its merits.

Our plan has been to collate and compile the information to be obtained from the most authentic sources, into a shape available for reference, thus enabling every person desirous of ascertaining the truth, to judge for himself. We do not vouch for the strict accuracy of every item established, but we are very certain that our tables are far more correct than any published hitherto ; and the reader may be assured that we have spared neither cost nor trouble to place before him such information as may be depended on for its general accuracy.

We shall pursue the same course in treating of the past and present condition of foreign navies ; and as France is, next to ourselves, the **power whose** fleet is maintained in the greatest force and efficiency, we shall begin with that country.

With reference to the past, we may briefly state, that up to a comparatively recent period, France maintained her position as a first-rate naval power, with fleets and squadrons little inferior to those of England in number, the ships being generally superior in point of size. Whether allied with other powers against us, or single-handed, **the** navy of France was not only sufficient to protect its own shores, but to **despatch** fleets and squadrons to the East and West Indies, for attack and defence ; and there is scarcely a battle on record wherein they did not outnumber us in ships, guns, and men.

The number of ships of the line, exclusive of fifties, frigates, and smaller vessels, possessed by France at several periods, is as follows :—

Y e a r .	Ships of the Line.	Year.	Ships of the Line.
1756	74	1814*.....*	73
1778	69	1816	72
1783	74	1819	68
1787	77	1824	61
1791	82	1825	59
1893.	82	1828	56
1794 . . . *	112	1830	52
1801	55	1840	49
1814	103		

It is remarkable, notwithstanding the enormous losses that France sustained, more particularly during the last war, and while the resources of that kingdom were directed in turn against every European nation, the mighty wielder of her destinies should have been able to maintain a navy ; and, in spite of successive defeats, of the loss of trade and colonies, even when the greatest portion of his seamen were languishing in English prisons, not only to keep up the number of

* After restoring the ships of Holland.

ships, but positively to increase it. When Buonaparte was overthrown, and the territory of France prescribed within its ancient bounds, the ships in the ports of Holland, and also some few building in the Italian States, reverted to their former possessors. The navy of France was then reduced to seventy-three ships of the line, and so far from having increased since that period, a reference to the foregoing figures shows a gradual decrease, as the ships became worn out, until at the present moment we believe it amounts to forty-eight ships only, the intention being to limit the number to forty sail of the line.

There are various good reasons for this, the principal of which appears to be, that, notwithstanding the desire apparent in every government, under every change of dynasty, to make France a **first-rate** maritime nation, her limited resources of seamen render it impossible to compete with England on equal terms, under present circumstances ; and therefore she has adopted the policy which we shall describe in the words of her minister of marine (M. Hyde de **Neuville**) when introducing the budget of his department in the Chambers, on the 30th of June, 1829.

It had been advanced in the debate, that the formation of fleets was useless against the superior power of England, and that such a system would waste the maritime resources of France, without a prospect of advantage. The minister **justified** himself in the following terms :—

“ Let me answer the reproach which has been made, ‘ that we **construct** more ships of the line than frigates, and that we are preparing to form fleets of the former only.’

“ I will not examine here what system of naval warfare France would have to follow, if she were under the necessity of contending **against** a powerful enemy; but this I know, that it would be incompatible with any sound reason to adopt an exclusive system. A great captain observed to me one day, ‘ that there was no readier way of getting beaten in war, than to lay down beforehand fixed rules of attack and **defence**, and to arrange the whole plan of a campaign from a cabinet.’ ‘ The system to follow,’ added he, ‘ is that which is pointed out, and rendered necessary, according as the enemy is to be resisted or assailed.’ Now, this is what we have to answer to those who believe they can resolve a question which no good naval officer would venture to pronounce upon in so decided a manner as they do.

“ Assuredly, if war broke out, it is probable that we should be little inclined to fighting in fleets. We have other means of contending with success; especially since steam navigation permits us to hope, that, henceforward, rigorous blockades will be nearly **impossible**. For, it

must be said, that it was by closing our ports, and thus depriving our fleets of all assistance, that the enemy generally succeeded in wresting victory from us.

“But, is the reproach which I am answering well founded? Gentlemen, you shall judge. We had, at the peace of 1814, seventy-three ships of the line.” M. Hyde de Neuville then enumerates the decrease, as shown, at page 494, and adds, “Here, then, is a reduction from 1814 to 1830 of twenty-one ships of the line!

We had, in 18 14 . .	42 frigates.
in 1823 . .	45 ditto.
in 1824 . .	47 ditto.
in 1828 . .	52 ditto.
in 1829 . .	53 ditto.

And we shall have, on the 1st of January, 1830, afloat and under construction,	}	. . 63 ditto.
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Increase from 18 14 to 1830, of . . 21 frigates.

Decrease in the same period of . . 21 ships of the line.

“You see, gentlemen, that we have been for several years pursuing the course which we are reproached with not following. I shall add, that five ships of the line were to have been constructed in 1830. I have ordered them to be replaced upon the stocks by double that number of frigates.”

After stating that the limits of his supplies had compelled him to diminish the total number of new constructions and thorough repairs for the years 1829 and 1830, the minister proceeded to say, “It must, however, not be dissembled, gentlemen, that this diminution, to which I have been forced in the number of our constructions, holds out to us a prospect for **the** future, which is but little satisfactory. All that we retrench from the annual mass of work, throws back by so much the accomplishment of a **system**, which was conceived with a wise prudence, and **which**, up to this time, has, for want of sufficient supplies, experienced the greatest difficulties in its developement.”

To Mr. Hyde de Neuville’s speech, we append his two official reports for the -year, which form a complete analysis of the French navy in **1829**; and when the reader contrasts these with the tables for 1839 and 1840, he will find that not only has there been a decrease of ships of the line, but of frigates also. In fact, they have at present but fifty of that class of vessels, afloat and building; being a decrease **of** thirteen from the former date, and the maximum of their intended peace establishment.

TABLE 1.

Account of Vessels afloat on the 1st of January, 1829.

	Vessels afloat on the 1st of January, 1829.	Vessels which will be launched in 1829.	TOTAL.	To deduct Vessels which will be surveyed, and probably condemned in 1829.	Presumed to exist on the 1st of January, 1830.
Ships of the line of the	8	.	8	.	8
{ first rate...	10	1	11	1	10
{ second rate	15		15	1	14
{ third rate .	11		11	.	11
{ fourth rate	9		9	.	9
Frigates of the	21		21		21
{ first class .	5		5		5
{ second class	1	2	3		3
{ third class	25	2	27	.	27
Corvettes of War	8	1	9		9
{ of 32 guns	15		15		15
{ of 24 guns	2	.	2		2
Brigs of 20 and of 16 guns	6		6		6
Despatch Corvettes of 18 guns	34	.	34		34
Despatch Brigs of 14 guns	15	1	16		16
Brigantines of 16 guns	27		27	1	26
Small Brigs	9	.	9		9
Gun Brigs	15		15		15
Schooners	4		4	.	4
Cutters, Luggers, Advice Boats, &c.	20		20		20
Gun Vessels	13		13	1	12
Steam Vessels	4		4		4
Transport Corvettes, of 800 tons	277	7	284	4	280
Vessels of Burden, 450 to 550 tons	-	2	-	2	2
Ditto ditto 300 to 400 tons					
Ditto ditto 200 to 250 tons					
Transports					
Yachts	279	7	286	4	282

TABLE 2.

Account of the Vessels under construction on the 1st of January, **1829**, and of those which will be laid upon the stocks in the course of the year.

	Vessels which will be worked upon in 1829.	To deduct vessels which will be launched in 1829.	Vessels which will be on the stocks on 31st Dec. 1829.	Vessels which will be laid on the stocks in 1830.	Vessels which will be worked upon in 1830.	To deduct vessels which will be launched in 1830.	Vessels which will be on the stocks on 31st Dec. 1830.
Ships of the line	21	1	20	1	21	..	21
Frigates	22	..	22	10	32	1	31
Corvettes of war	9	2	7	4	11	6	5
Brigs of 20 guns	5	2	3	4	7	3	4
Despatch Corvettes	2	1	1	..	1	1	..
Despatch Brigs	4	..	4	5	9	3	6
Cutters, Luggers, Advice Boats, &c.	1	1
Steam Vessels	7	..	7	2	9	2	7
Transports Corvettes	5	..	5	..	5	..	5
Vessels of Burden	4	::	4	2	6	1	5
Total	80	7	73	28	101	17	84

The minister alludes to the “**system** conceived by a wise prudence,” which he was then intent on working out. This system has, to the extent adopted, produced a complete regeneration of the French navy, as regards the size and armament of vessels : it is the occasion of the disparaging contrasts which have been so repeatedly drawn between the ships of our rivals and ourselves ; and calculated to effect such changes, and involve us in such expenses, that we shall be doing an acceptable service to the reader, desirous of information, by detailing its origin and progress, the more so, as we do not remember that it has ever been published in this country, being printed for the use of the official functionaries only.

Shortly after the close of the war, M. Dupin, who has furnished to the world a better account of our uaval arsenals than any similar description to be found in our language, impressed upon his countrymen the necessity for increasing the size and weight of metal of their ships, their frigates particularly, having seen in England several **large** vessels of this class constructed for the purpose of encountering the Americans on equal terms. His opinion was backed by French naval officers of distinction, amongst others by Admiral Duperré, who commanded the French squadron in the West Indies in 1819, and visited the Chesapeake in the Gloire frigate in that year, when he was much struck with the large dimensions and heavy **ordnance of the** American ships. In 1820, an intelligent French officer, (Captain

Montgery,) was **despatched** to the United States of America, for the purpose of making inquiries relative to steam navigation, and he **produced** on his return some interesting information, respecting the American navy.

The French government became impressed with the policy of **following** the example of the Americans, and by abandoning the construction of vessels of the old dimensions, and building in future none but very superior ones, they entailed upon England the necessity of following their example, at an enormous expense, or the **liability** of defeat in future wars, by opposing to the ships of France vessels of inferior force.

In order to dispose of the ships of the line, it was resolved to convert them into frigates, by the process of razeeing ; being the same course as was hastily adopted by ourselves at the close of last war; and this was successfully performed upon the *Romulus*, a ship of **74 guns**, cut down to a **58-gun** frigate, and named the *Guerrière*.

Subsequently Mons. (now the Baron) Tupinier produced a very able memoir, in which he exposed the injurious consequences of adhering to the old **system**—the benefit to be expected from enlarging the ships of each class—and he gave some detailed calculations, to show the advantage and practicability of adopting an improved system. He laid down the **following** postulates :-

“ That the dimensions of French ships of the line and **frigates** are too small (with a few exceptions only), in proportion to their force of ordnance, and the number of men which they have to carry.

“ That the insufficiency of these dimensions is **particularly** remarkable in the N-pounder frigates, which have been already constructed and **armed**.

“ That these frigates (otherwise very handsome and **perfectly** well-built), have too little capacity for the weight which they have to carry ; from which results an immersion of **27 centimetres** ($10\frac{3}{8}$ inches) more than was intended on their original draught ; and that they **carry** their ports too low by 22 centimetres ($8\frac{3}{8}$ inches), notwithstanding the **precaution** taken to augment their **fulness** by 54 **millimetres** ($2\frac{1}{8}$ inches).

“ That these essential defects result from inaccuracies in **calculating** the weights which vessels of war have to carry, and, above all, from the practice which has long obtained of confining within limits excessively straitened the adjustment of the dimensions of the immersed body.

“ That the same defects have been observable in the most celebrated ships of -the line, whenever a heavier calibre or an increased number of guns has been put into them.

“That the present armament of French ships of the line of two decks is no longer analogous to the force of vessels of the same rate recently constructed by the Americans, and which are about to be imitated by the English, but that to change this armament it will first be necessary to lay down larger ships of the line.

“That it is a disastrous error in naval matters to make economy consist in having vessels of small dimensions. They cost less, indeed, but they are more easily beaten ; and it would be to compromise the honour of the king’s colours to persist in the confidence which has been placed in them hitherto.”

Assuming these data, the accuracy of which appears indisputable, he proposed :-

1. To retain for **first-rate** ships of the line those of **118** guns, constructed by Baron Jane, being most scrupulously attentive to augment in no respect the weight they have to carry, under **pretence** of making them stronger in ordnance.

2. To adopt two new rates of ships of the line of two decks ; the one of **102** guns, of which thirty should be long **36-pounders**, on the lower deck ; thirty-four **30-pounder** guns on the main deck ; and **thirty-six** 36-pounder carronades on the quarter deck and fore-castle.

The other of ninety-six guns, of which thirty should be long **36-pounders**, on the lower deck ; thirty-two long **24-pounders**, on the main deck ; and thirty-four **36-pounder** carronades on the quarter deck and fore-castle.

3. To construct no more ships of the line smaller than the **last**—those of **96** guns.

4. To arm the Baron Jané’s **80-gun** ships with thirty **30-pounder** guns, on the lower deck ; thirty-two **24-pounder** guns on the main deck ; and twenty-four **30-pounder** carronades on the quarter deck and fore-castle.

5. To arm the **74-gun** ships which are new, or at least in very good condition, with twenty-eight **30-pounder** guns, on the lower deck ; thirty **H-pounder** guns, on the main deck ; and twenty-four **30-pounder** carronades on the quarter deck and fore-castle.

6. To cut down all the **74-gun** ships which stand in need of thorough repair, in order to convert them into frigates of **fifty-eight 36-pounders** like Guerrikre.

7. To have in future three classes of frigates, armed with sixty pieces of ordnance, (of which thirty shall be long guns, and thirty carronades,) of the calibre of **36 lbs.** for the first class, **30 lbs.** for the second class, and **24 lbs.** for the third class.